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Breaking the prejudice habit:  
Automaticity and control in the context of a long-term goal 
 The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of work on automaticity and control.  
This work has led to the creation of so-called “dual-process theories”, which argue that people’s 
behavior can be driven by either relatively automatic or relatively controlled processes.  By 
focusing on the various factors that influence the type of processes activated in any given 
situation, dual process theories have productively advanced our understanding of behavior, both 
in general (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), and in specific domains, like 
person perception (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Brewer, 1988), attributional inference (Gilbert, 
1989), and persuasion (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
 One dual process theory that stands out as unique from the others is the prejudice habit 
model (Devine, 1989; Devine & Monteith, 1993).  The prejudice habit model differentiates itself 
from other dual process theories in two primary ways.  First, rather than describing a particular 
class of behavior, the prejudice habit model develops a theoretical analysis of a particular social 
problem, that of lingering discrimination despite increasingly positive beliefs about out-groups.  
Second, because of its concern with a social problem, the prejudice habit model concerns itself 
not only with the interplay between automatic and controlled processes within a single moment, 
but also with how this interplay is guided and structured by a person’s long-term goals.  Because 
of these two characteristics, the prejudice habit model is less specific than other dual process 
theories in its assumptions about both the precise means through which automatic processes 
influence behavior (e.g., the activation of stereotypes versus the activation of evaluations) and 
the precise controlled processes that oppose the influence of the automatic processes (e.g., 
inhibition, suppression, correction, or other control mechanisms).  Instead, the model trades 
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theoretical specificity for the ability to ground automaticity and control within a broad societal 
and temporal context. 
 In what follows, we will describe the problem that motivated the development of the 
prejudice habit model, namely, that even people who report beliefs and attitudes that are opposed 
to prejudice can act in discriminatory ways.  We will then review the prejudice habit model and 
how the model uses the distinction between controlled and automatic processes to understand 
lingering group disparities.  We will end our discussion with a review of topics for further 
research and the implications of the prejudice habit model for other dual process theories. 
Automaticity and the prejudice paradox 
 To understand the prejudice habit model, one must first understand the paradox the model 
was developed to explain.  The Civil Rights Movement gave birth to dramatic changes in laws 
and personal norms that, in combination, made overt discrimination illegal and socially taboo.  In 
wake of these legal and normative changes, national surveys have revealed both increasingly 
positive attitudes towards minorities and decreasing endorsement of minority stereotypes 
(Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Elliot & Devine, 1995).  Despite these improvements, 
minorities continue to have more adverse outcomes than majority group members in domains 
ranging from education (Steele, 1997), to employment (Bertrand & Malainathan, 2004), to health 
and well-being (e.g., Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003). 
 The societal-level paradox has been accompanied by a personal-level paradox.  When 
people perform tasks that unambiguously measure prejudice, such as self-report measures of 
racial attitudes, their responses are, consistent with the national survey data, generally positive 
and nonprejudiced.  However, when many people perform tasks on which the nonprejudiced 
response is ambiguous, their responses subtly favor majority group members over minority 
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group members (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980).  This pattern of results occurs even among 
people who report that they believe that prejudice is wrong (Devine, 1989).  
 The contradiction that people who disavow prejudice can still act with bias has presented 
scholars with a difficult problem, both theoretically and practically.  Theoretically, the 
contradiction has led to ambiguity how to interpret responses on tasks on which participants are 
able to monitor their behavior, such self-report measures.  Some theorists have gone so far as to 
conclude that self-report measures are irrevocably contaminated by strategic self-presentation 
concerns (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and that the apparent improvement in people’s self-
reported attitudes masks underlying negative “true attitudes” (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 
2002; Crosby et al., 1980).  This type of reasoning leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the 
normative changes wrought by Civil Rights legislation are illusory in the sense that they have not 
create genuine intentions to act without prejudice. 
If responses on measures permitting conscious monitoring are taken to reflect 
nonprejudiced intentions, an open theoretical question remains about the psychological 
process(es) that are responsible for the disparity between overt and subtle indicators of bias.  In 
order to operate despite people’s intentions, these processes must satisfy at least some of the 
formal criteria for automaticity (i.e., operate below the threshold of awareness, become activated 
quickly and unintentionally, and be difficult to control; Bargh, 1994). 
The available evidence suggests that the processes leading to unintentional bias are not 
perfectly automatic (see Devine, 2001; Devine & Monteith, 1999).  However, the biases are 
acquired easily, often after as little as a single exposure to negative evaluative information 
(Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005), and early, perhaps as young as age 6 (Baron & Banaji, 
2006).  Once acquired, the biases are also frequently activated due to the saturation of stereotypic 
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information within the social environment (Gerbner, 1998).  These biases then become 
overlearned to the point that, even if they are not perfectly automatic, they are activated as fast as 
between 300 ms and 600 ms after cue onset (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006; Ito, Thompson, 
& Cacioppo, 2004).  Likewise, on tasks that occur quickly enough to preclude deliberative 
responding, merely instructing people to avoid bias appears to do little to prevent biases from 
occurring, suggesting that the processes leading to bias are difficult to control (e.g., Kim, 2003). 
Thus, the debate about whether the processes leading to unintentional bias are “truly” 
automatic is in some ways unimportant, at least from the perspective of people concerned about 
the consequences of these processes.  What is important is that these processes bias peoples’ 
behavior, and that these biased behaviors can have dramatic consequences for outgroup 
members, such as false recognition of Black faces in crime contexts (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & 
Davies, 2004), poorer quality interactions with majority group members (Richeson & Shelton, 
2003), and disparate allocation of health and economic resources (Green et al., 2007; Amodio & 
Devine, 2006) resources. Furthermore, these biased behaviors are ones that – were the 
perpetrators aware of them – most would find both immoral and unacceptable. 
The existence of lingering bias that is to some extent automatic leaves open the practical 
problem of whether the biases can be eliminated, and, if so, how.  Some theorists have argued 
that no methods will effectively reduce subtle biases, and that subtle biases are inevitable due to 
the natural constraints of human cognition (see Billig, 1985; Bargh, 1999).  The prejudice habit 
model challenges arguments about both the inevitability of prejudice and the interpretation of 
self-report measures as merely reflecting strategic self-presentation (Devine, 1989; Devine & 
Monteith, 1993).  The model draws on dual-process theory logic to argue that, like unwanted 
habits, relatively automatic implicit stereotypes and evaluations can cause otherwise well-
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intentioned people to unwittingly perpetuate discrimination.  However, rather than concluding 
that the existence of automatic bias inevitably leads people to discriminate against outgroups, the 
prejudice habit model argues that, if people have sufficient personal motivation to overcome bias 
and awareness of their bias, they can exert effort by deploying controlled processes to “break the 
prejudice habit”.  Even if this effort is not sufficient to disrupt the automatic processes leading to 
discrimination within a single moment, the effort can lead to increased efficiency in the 
regulation of prejudice in future situations, thereby increasing the probability that people will 
bring behavior in line with intention in situations where they might once have failed. 
  The importance of the prejudice habit model stems from both theoretical and practical 
concerns.  Theoretically, the model allows a more nuanced understanding of the apparent 
paradox of so-called “modern” forms of prejudice.  Although many people have genuinely 
renounced prejudice, lingering stereotypic and evaluative associations can still cause people to 
fail to live up to their intentions in ambiguous or time-pressured situations, leading to negative 
outcomes for out-group members.  The model thus highlights the internal struggle of a person 
attempting to overcome prejudice (Allport, 1954), and understands that person’s actions in any 
one moment as only one snapshot of a person’s overall self-regulatory process.  Practically, the 
model outlines the necessary conditions for breaking the prejudice habit, both over a short and a 
long timescale.  By outlining these conditions, the habit model offers a practical potential 
roadmap for eliminating lingering disparities linked to automatic bias. 
 In the following sections, we outline the conditions the prejudice habit model argues are 
necessary to overcome prejudice – personal motivation to rid oneself of automatic bias, 
awareness of the bias, and efforts in deploying controlled processes to reduce the bias.  All of 
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these components are discussed in the context of a regulatory process to achieve the long-term 
goal of prejudice reduction. 
The components of control 
The internal struggle: Personal motivation to respond without prejudice 
 The personal motivation to reduce prejudice stems from a long-term goal to reduce one’s 
bias.  Thus, before people can develop a personal motivation to reduce bias, they must establish 
an identity that is opposed to prejudice and thereby adopt a long-term goal to reduce prejudice.  
On the basis of this logic, Devine and Monteith (1993) argued that the establishment of an 
egalitarian self-concept is a necessary precondition for personally motivated self-regulation of 
prejudice-related bias to occur.   
Once a long-term goal to reduce prejudice has been adopted, this goal, and the motivation 
that stems from it, structures peoples’ orientations to their environment, changing how people 
interprets the situations they encounters and their reactions to those situations.  By changing 
peoples’ orientations towards their environments, personal motivation to respond without bias is 
important to the self-regulatory process in three primary ways.  First, this motivation generates 
intentions consistent with the long-term goal of overcoming bias.  Second, the motivation leads 
to the establishment of self-regulatory standards that are used to monitor and evaluate progress 
towards the long-term goal.  Third, the motivation heightens the affective consequences of acting 
in ways that are inconsistent with the long-term goal. 
The first change, generating intentions conducive to progress towards the goal of 
eliminating prejudice, is a dynamic process that occurs after one has identified a situation as 
relevant to the regulation of prejudice (i.e., after the identification of a situation as relevant to 
one’s long-term goals).  The identification of a situation as goal-relevant generates a search for 
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opportunities to behave in ways that are conducive to goal progress.  Thus, in interracial 
interactions, for example, the personal motivation to respond without prejudice is linked to 
intentions to treat the interaction partner fairly (Plant & Devine, 2009; Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 
2010).  After a perceived self-regulatory failure, such as the rejection of a qualified job candidate 
on the basis of the candidate’s sexual orientation (Monteith, 1993), personal motivation is linked 
to interest in and attention to materials perceived to be useful in eliminating subtle bias.  By 
generating intentions to act in ways that are consistent with long-term goals, motivation orients a 
person to the situational affordances that their further long-term goals. 
The second change, the establishment of personally endorsed self-regulatory standards, 
allows people to effectively monitor goal progress.  Standards define the behaviors that are 
considered violations of a goal.  By comparing their standards to current behavior, people can 
determine whether their behavior is different from what they believe is appropriate (Devine, 
Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991).  This comparison between standards and behavior provides 
information about the current rate of change towards or away the long-term goal of eliminating 
bias (Carver & Scheier, 1990).  Greater personal motivation is related to stricter, better 
internalized, and more well-defined standards; thus, motivation helps determine the behaviors 
that are considered goal-relevant (Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). 
The final change, heightening the affective consequences of behaving in goal-
inconsistent ways, is interrelated with the establishment of standards to monitor goal progress.  
Once people establish well-defined standards to regulate bias, these standards engage an ongoing 
monitoring process that orients peoples’ attention to violations of the standards.  To the extent 
that people perceive the long-term goal of regulating bias as personally relevant, violations of the 
standards are interpreted as moral failures, generating guilt (Devine et al., 1991).  Combined with 
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the aforementioned intentions to eliminate prejudice, the guilt generated by violations of a 
person’s standards motivates later efforts to bring behavior in line with that person’s goals 
(Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002; Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). 
Thus, personal motivation to respond without prejudice engages a dynamic self-
regulatory process; when situations are perceived to be relevant to the long-term goal of 
eliminating prejudice, motivation generates situation-specific intentions to act consistently with 
those goals.  Motivation also leads to the establishment of standards useful in monitoring goal 
progress, and leads to the interpretation of behaviors inconsistent with those standards as moral 
failures, leading to guilt and efforts to bring future behavior more in line with one’s standards. 
The external struggle: Being motivated for social reasons 
A personally held goal is not the only reason people might be motivated to respond 
without prejudice.  The establishment of strong anti-prejudiced norms has created compelling 
external reasons to respond without prejudice.  The establishment of anti-prejudiced norms and 
anti-discriminatory legislation was motivated at least in part by the hope that the creation of 
these external reasons to respond without prejudice would eventually create internally endorsed 
intentions to respond without prejudice.  An important question arising from these changes is 
whether external motivation spurred by anti-prejudiced norms creates self-regulatory processes 
similar to those created by internal motivation.  This question assumes both theoretical and 
practical importance, as answering this question would enable social scientists to evaluate 
whether external motivation can fulfill similar self-regulatory functions as internal motivation 
and thereby judge whether anti-discriminatory legislation has succeeded in its goal of generating 
internally endorsed intentions to respond without prejudice. 
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To help address questions about the potentially different implications of internal (i.e., 
value and / or goal-driven) and external (i.e., social) motivations to respond without prejudice, 
Plant and Devine (1998) created separate measures of these motivations, namely the Internal 
Motivation Scale (IMS) and the External Motivation Scale (EMS).  Interestingly, despite the 
hopes on the part of activists and legislatures that external motivation would eventually lead to 
internal motivation, both Plant and Devine (1998) and subsequent researchers have consistently 
found that the internal and external scales are only mildly correlated, if at all (e.g., r = -.15, Plant 
& Devine, 1998; r = -.05 to -.01, Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005; r = .14, Ratcliff, Lassiter, 
Markman, & Snyder, 2006).  This suggests that the two sources of motivation operate somewhat 
independently of each other.  Subsequent research has found that external motivation also has 
very different self-regulatory implications than internal motivation. 
First, in contrast to the intentions to eliminate prejudice that are associated with internal 
motivation, external motivation is associated with intentions serving the long-term goal of hiding 
prejudice from others (Plant & Devine, 2009).  This subtle difference in intention can have 
dramatic consequences for behavior.  Because externally motivated people are primarily 
concerned with how they appear to others, their behavior is strategic; if a given situation does not 
provide the proper affordances to hide prejudice from others, externally motivated people do not 
attempt to regulate their prejudice.  Thus, external motivation is associated with interest in and 
attention to materials perceived to prevent detectable (overt) forms of prejudice, but not 
necessarily undetectable (subtle) forms of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 2009).  In interracial 
interactions, externally motivated people adopt intentions to hide their prejudice from their 
interaction partner, an intention that, because it does not lead to strategies that create a smooth 
interaction, is ironically associated with greater perceived expressions of prejudice by the 
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interaction partner (Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 2010).  Overall, because internal and external 
motivations serve different long-term goals, internally and externally motivated people are 
oriented to different kinds of situational affordances.  These differences in orientation lead to 
differences in which aspects of a particular situation are perceptually salient and, consequently, 
in the situational intentions that differently motivated people adopt. 
Internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice also have different 
implications for the standards used to regulate prejudiced behavior.  Whereas the standards of 
internally motivated people serve as a basis for determining whether their behavior is consistent 
with the long-term goal of eliminating bias, the standards of externally motivated people are 
functionally different, serving the long-term goal of hiding bias (Plant & Devine, 1998).  Instead 
of using their own standards to regulate their behavior, externally motivated people use what 
they perceive to be the standards of others, and they only use these standards in the presence of a 
perceived audience that is thought to disapprove of prejudice.  Thus, while both internally and 
externally motivated people may regulate their prejudice in the presence of a perceived audience 
known to disapprove of prejudice, externally motivated people relax their regulatory standards 
outside the presence of this perceived audience (Plant & Devine, 1998; 2001; 2009). 
Finally, external motivation is related to different interpretations of violations of self-
regulatory standards.  Because externally motivated people use the perceived standards of others 
to regulate their behavior, violations of the standards are interpreted as signals of imminent 
social sanctions, and thus generate feelings of threat and anger directed at the perceived source of 
the social sanctions (Higgins, 1987; Plant & Devine, 1998).  The implications of the threat and 
anger are that, when social pressure to respond without prejudice is lifted, externally motivated 
people experience backlash at the curtailment of their psychological freedom, attempting to 
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restore this freedom by responding with greater prejudice than if pressure had not been applied in 
the first place (Plant & Devine, 2001).  Though not tested to date, one provocative interpretation 
of this backlash is that at least some externally motivated people react to external pressure to 
conform with anti-prejudiced norms by establishing self-concepts defined by the expression 
prejudice despite external pressure, thus developing a motivation to express prejudice. 
Thus, accumulating evidence suggests that the changes in norms have not been uniformly 
successful in generating internally endorsed intentions to respond without prejudice.  People who 
are strongly motivated to conform with these norms regulate themselves in a very different way 
from people who are motivated to respond without prejudice for internal reasons, experiencing 
an external struggle between norms and automatic bias, rather than an internal struggle between 
values and automatic bias.  The external struggle leads to differences in the intentions that guide 
self-regulatory efforts, the standards used to evaluate goal progress, and the interpretation of 
instances of goal failure.  Overall, the external struggle may even lead to resentment and 
behavioral backlash, and, to the extent that people come to define their self-concepts by resisting 
social pressure through covert expressions of prejudice, perhaps even the development of a 
motivation to express prejudice. 
The role of awareness in the bias reduction process 
Regardless of whether people are motivated to respond without prejudice for internal or 
external reasons, motivation seems to structure the intentions people adopt and the way they 
monitor and evaluate progress towards their goals.  However, motivation by itself will not spur 
self-regulatory efforts unless people notice that they are succeeding or failing at their goals.  This 
logic forms the basis of the awareness component of the prejudice habit model. 
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The prejudice habit model has generally distinguished between two types of awareness.  
The first type of awareness is chronic awareness, or the extent to which a person is chronically 
sensitive to one’s level of bias (Devine & Monteith, 1993).  The second type of awareness is 
momentary awareness, or the extent to which, within a given situation, one is aware of one’s 
bias.  Momentary awareness has been further subdivided into prospective awareness, or 
awareness that one has the potential to act with bias, and retrospective awareness, or awareness 
that one has already acted with bias (Monteith et al., 2002). 
Both situational and chronic awareness are important to the regulation of prejudice.  
Chronic awareness generates a monitoring process that increases the likelihood that self-
regulation will occur in any given situation (Monteith et al., 2002).  However, this monitoring 
process must be triggered within a given situation for self-regulation to occur.1  Thus, successful 
self-regulation will occur when people translate chronic awareness into situational awareness, 
resulting in the exertion of self-regulatory effort (Monteith & Mark, 2005). 
Chronic awareness is closely linked to the standards that people have for regulating their 
bias.  As people monitor the extent to which their actual responses differ from their standards, 
they develop a set of relatively enduring beliefs about the level of bias present in their ongoing 
behavior (Devine et al., 1991).  Chronic awareness has been conceptualized as the extent to 
which peoples’ beliefs about the degree of bias in their behavior differ from their standards 
(Devine et al., 1991).  The close linkage in the conceptualization of motivation and chronic 
awareness illustrates the theorized reciprocal relationships between motivation and chronic 
awareness.  Because motivation generates standards to help evaluate and monitor goal progress, 
it also eventually generates beliefs about one’s level of bias and, to the extent that these beliefs 
are accurate, chronic sensitivity to one’s level of bias.  To the extent that people believes that 
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their actual level of bias differs from their standards, chronic awareness can also spur increased 
motivation; the discrepancy between the standard and the believed level of actual bias generates 
guilt, which spurs future motivated tendencies to bring behavior in line with standards. 
Within a specific situation, awareness can be triggered either prior to a biased response 
(prospective awareness) or after a biased response has already occurred (retrospective 
awareness).  Most of the research on awareness has focused on the consequences of retrospective 
awareness.  As described in the motivation section, this work has revealed that retrospectively 
becoming aware of bias generates guilt, at least among people who are personally (i.e., 
internally) motivated to respond without bias (Devine et al., 1991).  Although retrospective 
awareness has typically been portrayed as the product of a relatively effortful introspective 
process (e.g., see Monteith et al., 2002), attention can be recruited to bias-relevant errors very 
quickly and efficiently, particularly among people who are highly internally motivated to 
respond without bias (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008).2 
Repeated retrospective awareness should also trigger increased chronic awareness, 
increasing overall sensitivity to future instances of bias.  Monteith and her colleagues (2002) 
argue that the chronic awareness generated through retrospective reflection may be somewhat 
situation-specific; the guilt generated by the retrospective reflection becomes associated with the 
characteristics of that situation, which later become “cues for control” that help trigger future 
prospective awareness.  Cues for control provide a warning that a person is at risk of acting in a 
biased way, recruiting attention to a given situation so that the person can deploy controlled 
processes to inhibit stereotypic responses. 
Bringing the components together: Effort 
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 In many ways, the deployment of effort to exercise control over stereotypic responses is 
the culmination of the regulation of a person’s biased responses.  Although both motivation and 
awareness may be necessary for the successful regulation of bias, Devine and colleagues have 
argued forcefully that they are insufficient to produce enduring reductions in bias (see Devine, 
Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012).  Indeed, they have argued that overcoming bias is likely to be a 
protracted process requiring considerable effort over time (Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991). 
Accordingly, Devine and colleagues have found that, when people who are motivated to 
reduce their bias are made situationally aware of their bias, they feel guilty, and the guilt 
motivates efforts to reduce bias.  For example, people made aware of their bias report more 
interest in and spend more time studying information that they believe will help reduce their bias 
(Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Monteith, 1993), and immediately after the guilt-
evoking experience, these same people regulate their prejudice by attending to and slowing their 
responses and by putting effort into tasks that they believe will reduce their bias (Monteith, 1993; 
Monteith et al., 2002; Monteith, Mark, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2010). 
In arguing that these experiences will be effective in reducing bias, these theorists have 
made two assumptions.  First, they has assumed that, to the extent that people exert effort 
intended to reduce their implicit bias immediately after a regulatory failure, they will be more 
efficient in regulating their bias in future situations.  In effect, the theorists have overlooked the 
question of whether effort exerted in one situation will actually be successful in reducing implicit 
bias in future situations by either decreasing the strength of future activation of bias or increasing 
the efficiency with which people deploy controlled processes.  Second, the theorists have 
assumed that people will know the proper strategies that, when deployed, will successfully 
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reduce implicit bias.  Effectively, participants have been left to their own devices to discover the 
strategies permitting successful regulation of bias. 
 Although little work has directly addressed the assumptions that effort will improve long-
term self-regulatory attempts, some recent work has identified a promising set of strategies that 
may successfully help regulate implicit bias.  These strategies have typically been tested by 
simply asking participants to perform the strategy as part of an experimental task; thus, the 
participants in these experiments were not regulating their prejudice, but rather merely 
complying with the instructions of the experimenter.  Despite the fact that the participants in 
these studies were not actively attempting to regulate their prejudice, many of these strategies, 
such as such as taking the perspective of stigmatized others (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and 
imagining counter-stereotypic examples (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001), lead to substantial reductions in implicit bias, at least for a short time (i.e., up to 24 
hours).  However, investigators have typically not tested whether the beneficial effects of these 
strategies on implicit bias endure beyond a single lab session.  Additionally, the prejudice habit 
model, along with a few other dual-process theories in psychology (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 
2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), predicts that, because the processes supporting automatic bias 
have developed through repeated activation from a lifetime’s exposure to biasing information in 
the social environment (Devine, 1989), these processes are only likely to change in an enduring 
way after considerable time, effort, and / or intensity of experience.  Thus, because one-shot 
interventions must counteract a large accretion of associative learning, they are unlikely to 
produce enduring change in automatic responses.  Such change is likely only after the 
application of considerable goal-directed effort over time. 
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 Devine and her colleagues (Devine et al., 2012) recently attempted to address the above 
shortcomings by designing and testing longitudinally an intervention that would produce 
enduring reductions in implicit bias.  Because the goal of the intervention was to engage a 
complex self-regulatory process, and because of the difficulty of knowing a priori which 
components of the intervention would be necessary or sufficient to produce enduring reductions 
in implicit bias (Prochaska & Velicer, 1997), the intervention was intentionally multi-faceted, 
containing components designed to engage awareness, motivation, and effort.  All participants in 
the study first completed an implicit measure of bias and received feedback about their level of 
implicit bias.  The completion of the implicit measure and the feedback served to make the 
participants situationally aware of their bias.  Participants who received the intervention then 
watched a 45 minute narrated slideshow.  The slideshow attempted to translate the situational 
awareness provided by the feedback into chronic awareness by educating the participants about 
what implicit bias is, how it is measured, and its consequences for outgroup members.  The 
slideshow then described the situations in which implicit bias can lead to subtle discrimination. 
To channel the motivation and awareness provided by the implicit bias education into 
effort that might have an impact on implicit bias, the slideshow next provided the participants 
with strategies culled from the literature that, were the participants to exert effort by practicing 
them in their everyday life, should lead to enduring reductions in implicit bias.  These strategies 
were intentionally diverse, including stereotype replacement (Devine & Monteith, 1993), 
counter-stereotypic imaging (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), individuation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990), perspective taking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and increasing opportunities 
for contact (Pettigrew, 1998).  Devine and colleagues reasoned that presenting a wide variety of 
strategies would enable participants to select those that best suited their particular situations 
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(Prochaska & Velicer, 1997).  At one and two months following the randomized intervention, 
Devine and colleagues measured an array of variables related to the prejudice habit model, 
including motivation, chronic awareness, effort, and implicit bias.  
The results of the study suggested that the intervention was successful.  Participants who 
received the intervention experienced dramatic reductions in implicit bias that endured up to two 
months after the intervention.  Participants who received the intervention also increased in 
chronic awareness and concern about discrimination, which that Devine and colleagues argued 
was related to motivation.  The participants who were most concerned about discrimination after 
receiving the intervention experienced the greatest reductions in implicit bias, highlighting the 
importance of motivation in the regulation of subtle bias.  Finally, Devine and colleagues also 
conducted a word-frequency analysis of free-response answers the participants gave to 
questionnaires about their strategy use.  Importantly, participants who used frequently used word 
stems relating to the implementation of bias-reducing strategies (e.g., implement*, practic*, 
appli*, use*, tri*) experienced the greatest reductions in implicit bias.  This last finding 
underscores the importance of effort in the successful regulation of bias. 
In developing an intervention that produces long-term reductions in implicit bias, 
increases in concern about discrimination, and increases in chronic awareness of one’s bias, 
prejudice habit model researchers have come full circle.  The theory was originally proposed to 
provide an understanding of the prejudice paradox that did not rely on arguments about the 
inevitability of prejudice or interpretations of all self-report measures as strategic self-
presentation.  Although the model proposed that implicit bias could be reduced in the long term 
given sufficient personal motivation, awareness, and effort, it was silent as to exactly how this 
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process would unfold.  Although many questions remain, we now have preliminary evidence 
strongly supporting the original conceptualization that prejudice is a habit that can be broken. 
Unanswered questions and recommendations for future research 
Research on the prejudice habit model over the past two decades has been extremely 
productive.  This research has demonstrated the challenges faced by people experiencing the 
“internal struggle” to eliminate unwanted implicit bias.  The research has also forcefully argued 
that, though the process of overcoming bias may be arduous, people can harness controlled 
processes to overcome automatic biases given sufficient motivation, awareness, and effort.  
However, many gaps in our understanding of how people overcome bias remain.  In the 
following sections, we will outline what we perceive to be the most pressing issues facing 
researchers using the habit framework.  We will organize our discussion according to the various 
components of the model.  We will finish our discussion with two methodological 
recommendations and a review of the implications of the model for other dual process theories. 
Developing an understanding of motivation’s development 
Although we know that motivation shapes the way a person regulates bias, we have large 
gaps in our knowledge about how motivation develops and how that development is affected by 
a person’s long-term goals and values.  Devine and Monteith (1993) argued that the motivation 
to respond without prejudice stems from values of equality, but to date we have little 
understanding of precisely how values of equality lead to a personal motivation to respond 
without prejudice.  Because of the abstract nature of values, valuing equality does not guarantee 
that the value is seen as relevant to prejudice towards a particular group (see Maio, Hahn, Frost, 
& Cheung, 2009).  Thus, the issue of how values of equality come to be seen as applicable to 
prejudice towards a particular group may be critical to understanding the relationship between 
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values and motivation.  Developing a more thorough understanding of the factors influencing the 
application of values to the regulation of prejudice might eventually enable us to develop 
interventions to change people’s motivations. 
Another important aspect of motivation that is currently not well-understood is how 
internal and external motivations develop over time.  On the basis of self-determination theory 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000), Devine and colleagues (2002) speculated that internal and external 
motivations follow a developmental trajectory whereby people first become motivated for 
external reasons, resulting in high levels of external motivation, then gradually internalize the 
external motivation, resulting in high levels of both internal and external motivation, and finally 
fully integrate the external motivation their self-concepts, resulting in high internal motivation 
only (see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).  Some evidence supports this argument; for 
example, compared to people who are motivated for both internal and external reasons, people 
who are motivated for only internal reasons have a preconscious sensitivity to bias-relevant 
errors (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008) and lower levels of implicit bias as assessed by 
both the IAT (Devine et al., 2002) and a startle eyeblink method (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & 
Devine, 2003).  This suggests that people who are motivated to respond without prejudice for 
only internal reasons are more efficient in their self-regulation than people who are both 
internally and externally motivated. 
However, the evidence does not uniformly support a self-determination perspective on 
the development of internal and external motivations.  For example, people who are primarily 
externally motivated have higher levels of explicit bias than people who are not motivated for 
either internal or external reasons (Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998) and respond with 
higher levels of anger, threat, and other forms of backlash when pressured to comply with 
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egalitarian norms (Plant & Devine 2001).  Although primarily externally motivated people do 
regulate their bias when doing so reduces the risk of receiving social sanctions, they appear to 
resent the external pressure to regulate their bias, and therefore seem to have internalized 
egalitarian norms to an even lesser extent than people who are neither internally nor externally 
motivated to respond without prejudice.  Studying the developmental sequence of motivation 
will allow us to better understand the interplay between internal and external motivations, which 
will provide us with more tools for developing interventions to increase internal motivation. 
Broadening our understanding of awareness 
Although researchers studying awareness have made a key distinction between 
momentary and chronic awareness, our knowledge of how chronic awareness becomes translated 
into momentary awareness (and how momentary awareness may lead to increased chronic 
awareness) is just emerging.  Part of the reason for this lack of knowledge is methodological; 
neither chronic nor momentary awareness have typically been used as outcome variables in 
experimental studies, with the result that we have little knowledge of the factors that causally 
influence either variable (but see Devine et al., 2012).  However, another potential reason for this 
lack of knowledge is that current researchers may have overlooked some of the complexities 
inherent in becoming aware of one’s bias. 
Developing awareness of one’s bias, either momentary or chronic, requires the 
application of knowledge about bias to both a specific situation and to oneself.  The specific 
content of this knowledge (i.e., a person’s lay theory; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) may have 
dramatic implications for whether people develop chronic or momentary awareness in the first 
place.  Without a lay theory of prejudice that posits that discrimination can arise unintentionally, 
people who consciously renounce prejudice but who still associate Black people with negative 
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stereotypes will mistake their good intentions for unbiased behavior, and thus will not engage 
controlled processes to regulate their prejudice. 
Lay theories of prejudice may also have important consequences for how people interpret 
biases that they do notice.  For example, if person believe that biases arise from intentions, those 
people may be more likely to make dispositional attributions from actions based on stereotypes 
(Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996).  These dispositional attributions may have dramatic 
inter- and intrapersonal consequences; a dispositional inference about another person may lead to 
avoidance of that person, while a dispositional inference about oneself may lead to avoidance of 
self-regulatory behavior (for similar arguments, see Carr, Rattan, & Dweck, 2012). 
 Another way in which the beliefs people have about bias may be important is in whether 
and how people calibrate their beliefs about their own bias to their actual level of bias.  Accuracy 
in the beliefs people have about their bias are important because these beliefs determine when 
and by how much people deploy effort in correcting their behavior.  Thus, having inaccurate 
beliefs may cause people to undercorrect their behavior in some situations and, perhaps, 
overcorrect in others.  Accurately attuning beliefs to actual bias is not a trivial task; because 
discrimination can happen unintentionally and without awareness, merely reflecting about past 
experiences with bias is unlikely to give an accurate estimate of actual vulnerability to bias.  The 
fact that beliefs about bias and actual levels of implicit bias are only modestly correlated (r  = 
.17; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001) is consistent with the argument that most 
people’s beliefs are not well-attuned with their actual levels of bias. 
 One final way in which general knowledge about bias might be important is in the 
application of general knowledge into a specific situation.  Although in some situations, there is 
a clear potential for discrimination and the non-prejudiced response is obvious, other situations 
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are more ambiguous in these respects (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; see also Maio, 2010).  Thus, 
whether people interpret a specific situation as relevant to the regulation of bias may be a key 
factor in triggering momentary awareness.  One promising avenue for research on this 
component of awareness is investigating how knowledge of bias is represented in memory; to the 
extent that knowledge of bias is connected to specific types of situations (such as job interviews), 
encountering those situations should be more likely trigger awareness of the potential for bias 
and subsequent self-regulatory efforts. 
Effort: The understudied component 
 Although effort is an integral part the prejudice habit model, it is also the least studied.  
Only one published study to date has investigated effort as an outcome of a self-regulatory 
process (Devine et al., 2012), and that study lacks a direct, precise measure of effort.  
Consequently, the remaining questions about how effort plays into the self-regulatory process are 
numerous.  For example, it is unclear precisely how much and what kinds of effort are required 
to produce changes in the various components of the prejudice habit model.  Effort in monitoring 
one’s thoughts could produce specialized increases in chronic awareness.  In contrast, effort 
exerted in taking the perspective of outgroup members could produce specialized increases in 
motivation and concern about discrimination. 
In a related question, we have little knowledge about the specific psychological processes 
that are affected by effort in reducing relatively automatic forms of bias.  The prejudice habit 
model predicts that repeated deployment of effort should increase the efficiency of future control 
of one’s bias; however, it is also possible that repeated deployment of effort directly reduces the 
activation automatic biases.  Forthcoming work suggests that the specific ways in which people 
overcome their bias (and maintain their bias at a low level) depend, at least in part, on the 
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strategies people use to overcome their bias and the amount of effort they exert in the 
deployment of these strategies (Monteith & Lybarger, in preparation).  Recently developed 
multinomial modeling techniques could help shed further light on the ways in which effort 
relates to the reduction of implicit bias (Payne, 2001; Conrey et al., 2005). 
Finally, it is unclear what factors determine whether effort exerted in one situation will 
translate into reductions in bias in a different situation.  Answering this question will be critical 
in understanding how effort creates long-term changes in the outcomes related to implicit bias.  
Overall, investigations on effort are in their infancy, and these investigations remain some of the 
most exciting avenues for future research on the prejudice habit model. 
Implications for other dual-process theories and two methodological recommendations 
 As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the main points of differentiation between 
the prejudice habit model and other dual process models is the habit model’s concern with a 
social problem and how, as a result, the prejudice habit model situates the interplay between 
automaticity and control within the context of the pursuit of a broader goal to treat people 
equally.  This integration of dual process theory logic into a broader self-regulatory framework is 
its main contribution to our understanding of dual process theories generally. 
 However, to empirically exploit the theoretical integration of a dual process analysis with 
self-regulatory processes, researchers should heed two methodological recommendations.  First, 
researchers studying prejudice and implicit bias should broaden the range of outcome variables 
that they study.  Perhaps because prejudice researchers have often had the meta-theoretical goal 
of finding methods to reduce implicit bias, they have become pre-occupied with using specific 
implicit measures of bias (such as the IAT) as their primary outcome measures.  However, 
implicit bias is not a unitary construct, and as a result, any one implicit measure is unlikely to 
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entirely capture the full range of psychological processes that lead to subtle discrimination 
(Amodio, 2009).  Additionally, a preoccupation with implicit measures of bias for their own sake 
has contributed to a lack of theoretical clarity about the other psychological factors involved in 
the regulation and reduction of implicit bias, like motivation, awareness, and effort.  As shown 
by Devine et al. (2012), maintaining a full theoretical appreciation of these variables is critical to 
developing interventions that produce long-term change in subtle bias. 
 The second recommendation is closely related to the first.  Because of its emphasis on the 
development and maintenance of long-term regulatory processes, the habit model has been from 
its inception a developmental model.  It is thus somewhat strange that researchers have until very 
recently not investigated the components of the model longitudinally.  One-shot experiments do 
allow snapshot views of the regulatory process, but without longitudinal designs, we will not be 
able to properly appreciate people’s regulatory struggles in the context of their long-term goals.  
A full investigation of the interplay of motivation, awareness, and effort in empowering people 
to control relatively automatic forms of bias demands the use of longitudinal designs. 
 Overall, the prejudice habit model has proved instrumental in advancing our knowledge 
of the process of reducing one’s bias.  Hopefully it will continue to prove productive in 
incrementally advancing its original goal of decreasing lingering disparities and empowering 
people to bring their behavior in line with their intentions.  
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Footnotes 
1It is possible that situational awareness need not be triggered in every situation for the 
regulation of bias to occur, at least in the sense that some people who successfully regulate their 
bias might not retrospectively report that they had any awareness of potential to act with bias.  
However, as we will note later, the processes that lead to situational awareness can themselves 
become efficient to the point of being triggered preconsciously (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-
Jones, 2008), suggesting that the detection of bias need not necessarily coincide with a 
phenomenal state of awareness.  Additionally, even if a phenomenal state of situational 
awareness is unnecessary for self-regulation in a given situation, the prejudice habit model 
predicts that chronic awareness is necessary for successful long-term self-regulation. 
 
2Note that the efficient, preconscious recruitment of attention to prejudice-relevant errors only 
occurs for people who are both high in internal motivation and low in external motivation to 
respond without prejudice.  Why the fast recruitment of attention occurs for this subgroup and no 
other is a question we will return to later in the chapter. 
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